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Cold Front: Lessons from History
Mar 24, 2010 – By Barry Zellen
As the Arctic continues to thaw, and with its thaw, to
integrate with the world ocean and the maritime economy that unites the
world, the question of which of America’s military commands is best
suited to defend the Arctic has been increasingly discussed by American
defense officials and their allied counterparts.
NORTHCOM, which is responsible for the defense of North
America, seems a likely choice to many – though the North American
Arctic remains the most secure part of the Far North, thanks in large measure
to the sparse population and extreme isolation of Canada's northern
archipelago. And PACOM, which is responsible for securing the Pacific, which
includes Alaska's North Pacific waters, contested by Japan in World War II
and threatened by the rising Soviet fleet in the Cold War, seems likely to
yet others, who note that the industrialized trading states of Northeast Asia
have a strong economic interest in the emerging trade routes across the top
of the world, and that China, America’s next most likely peer
competitor, eyes the Arctic through a Pacific lens like Tokyo did a
generation earlier.
But widespread usage of northern shipping lanes still
remains a long way off – even if some tentative seasonal use is already
being made of the Northern Sea Route, the Arctic Bridge between Murmansk and
Churchill, and the famed Northwest Passage. As one well known Arctic
geographer recently reminded me, "There's always going to be winter. And
with winter, the ice will return."
While less often argued, I believe as strong a case can be
made for EUCOM as the regional command best suited for the defense of the
Arctic, since the most probable emergent threat to northern security emanates
from a bolder, resurgent, resource-enriched Russia, currently the most
aggressive of the Arctic states, as shown by its symbolic 2007 polar
flag-planting on the deep sea floor. Geography sides with the European
Command, since Russia owns by far the largest sector of Arctic coast, and by
quirk of plate tectonics, the shallowest Arctic continental shelf; so as the
Arctic thaws, Russia will have greater access to a greater share of the
Arctic's long-hidden resource wealth than any other Arctic state. History
also appears to be on the side of the Arctic being viewed as part of EUCOM's
Area of Operations, as the longest recent conflict in Arctic waters was not
the relatively brief battle for the Aleutians, but the longer Battle of the
Atlantic. Even the Maritime Strategy at the Cold War's end viewed the
Arctic's undersea domain as primarily a route to contain Russia's fleet in
its home waters, before it could menace North America.
For these reasons, discussed in more detail below, the key
to a secure Arctic, at least while the Arctic remains seasonally frozen and
regionally isolated, remains tied to the fate of Europe, and the ambitions of
its largest state: Russia.
World War II and the Battle of the
Atlantic
Arctic waters came into play during the six year Battle of
the Atlantic from 1939-1945, considered by many to be the longest continuous
military campaign of the Great War. Efforts to assert command of the seas,
especially vital to ensure Britain's survival as an independent country, but
also important for resupply efforts of our wartime allies including Russia,
and German efforts to deny North Atlantic waters to us, resulted in an
ongoing naval clash between allied and axis sea power. Convoys resupplying
the UK, and lendlease runs to Murmansk, traveled northeast past Newfoundland,
through waters south of Greenland and Iceland, on their way to free Europe;
so the high North Atlantic and Arctic waters have long been viewed through
the lens of the Atlantic alliance.
After Denmark fell to the Nazis, the Germans eyed Greenland
as their first stage of an invasion route of mainland North America via the
Gulf of St. Lawrence, up to upper Canada along the Great Lakes, much the way
Britain did during the War of 1812. The vulnerability of Greenland resulted
in America extending defense protection to Greenland on behalf of the Danish
government in exile, which continued after the war through the entire Cold
War era as Soviet naval power grew. Had the Germans gained possession of
Greenland it could have put their fleet in striking distance of Newfoundland,
enabling a two-pronged attack of strategic British territories; so
guaranteeing Greenlandic security was viewed as a necessity to ensure the
independence of Britain. Then, had Britain fallen, keeping the Germans out of
Greenland, Newfoundland, and inevitably Canada would have been harder and
America’s northeast maritime frontier and northern land frontier would
have been highly vulnerable, much as the Aleutians were to aggressive use of
Japanese naval power.
"Whoever Holds Alaska..."
One could take Billy Mitchell's geopolitical saying on
Alaska from the 1930s ("I believe that, in the future, whoever holds
Alaska will hold the world... I think it is the most important strategic
place in the world") and apply it to the high North Atlantic, at least
with regard to European and North American security. In this case, whoever
holds Iceland and Greenland seems destined to command the North Atlantic. (In
fact, Tom Clancy imagined Iceland being the strategic pivot in a future
battle for the North Atlantic between NATO and the Soviet Union; and the role
of the G-I-UK gap during the Cold War for both Soviet and NATO naval strategy
was central, though untested by war.) The Maritime Strategy of 1986 likewise
viewed the Arctic and the North Atlantic as important areas for forward
operations to contain the projection of Soviet naval power; critics feared it
would destabilize deterrence but in the end it helped reassure Europe that
Soviet power was far less potent that Moscow wanted people to believe.
In terms of economic potential, North Sea oil, the fisheries
of the North Atlantic, as well as the sea lanes vital for transatlantic
trade, all illustrate the strategic-economic importance of the high North
Atlantic as a bridge connecting Europe and North America. As the Arctic
thaws, North Atlantic sea lanes, fisheries and natural resource deposits will
creep further north, further into Arctic seas, eventually facilitating an
Asia-Europe sea bridge – but the fundamental strategic relationship
will remain the same. So it makes sense to view the Arctic, as it becomes
increasingly navigable and economically integrated, as an extension of the
North Atlantic. With a polar thaw, Northeast Asian trading states will find a
shorter and quicker direct route to markets in Europe, making the security of
the ports in the North Atlantic, and the sea lanes they interconnect, even
more valuable.
The longer term potential of trans-Arctic shipping,
increased usage of the Northwest Passage, and the Northern Sea Route, while
promising, has a long ways to go before being viable – the Koreans,
Chinese and Japanese are eyeing shorter and safe shipping lanes to Europe
over the top and the Koreans seem ahead when it comes to ice-hardened
tankers, and the Russians seem to be ahead when it comes to heavy
icebreakers, though the combined "West" fields comparable
icebreaking assets when combined. While connecting Northeast Asian markets to
Europe through an Arctic maritime bridge is compelling, there will always be
winter and with winter, new ice will form in the Arctic basin limiting the
year-round viability of such sea routes – so I doubt we will see things
tip entirely toward the Pacific, particularly given the extraordinarily close
and enduring transatlantic relationships that have been forged across
centuries of trade, wartime and peacetime alliances, and the much less united
strategic environment in Northeast Asia. When transpolar shipping does become
more frequent, however, we may find reason for PACOM and EUCOM to consider
joint operations in the Arctic.
Even with Asian states eyeing Arctic trade routes, the North
Atlantic still features in most of their plans: Iceland may well become the
primary trans-shipment hub for Asian tankers, or a major port such as
Rotterdam on the mainland of Europe, which will mean the high North Atlantic
will still be of critical strategic importance. That may be one reason why
Moscow was first to step up with an offer of neighborly assistance to bail
out Iceland when its economy collapsed, hoping to nudge Iceland a bit out of
the western camp and help Moscow expand its influence in the high North
Atlantic, counterbalancing the Scandinavian countries that have maritime
borders with Russia.
The Inuit Dimension
If Greenland likewise became estranged from the West, and
ultimately pursued an unfriendly secession from Denmark and ended up hostile
to western interests (for the moment, its independence movement is a friendly
one, with Denmark's blessing, but that could always change), Moscow may find
yet another friendly island-state open to courtship, and that would certainly
favor its strategic position, putting pressure on the West and its command of
the high North Atlantic. Going forward, the US and its NATO allies might be
wise cultivate warmer relations with all the micro-states and territories of
the high North Atlantic and Arctic. Alaska and Iceland have especially close
political ties, so this could be a good foundation since state leaders in
Alaska have fostered warm ties with Iceland's government.
Greenland may well be the key, since no one at this stage
can even imagine where the sentiment and loyalties of an independent
Greenland will lay. If the festering tensions between Europe and Canada's
Inuit is any indication, there's much need for some fence-mending. Embracing
the Inuit and their seal-hunting traditions would also go far to reduce
tensions between the Inuit and the Europeans (who oppose seal hunting and the
fur trade generally, despite their long history of fur empires which,
ironically, fostered their economic colonization of much of North America,
from the strategic trading post at old Fort Niagara where the destiny of the
continent was determined two and a half centuries ago, to the Hudson's Bay
posts scattered across Rupert's Land, integrating the political economies of
Europe with the High North for the first time in human history.) More
concerted confidence building measures (CBMs) could help to ensure that the
interests of the Inuit, and of the modern states that jointly claim
sovereignty over their homeland, remain aligned.
And this might in turn help thaw relations between the Inuit
of Greenland as well as between Canada and the EU, helping to solidify
transatlantic relations to boost regional security. During February's meeting
of G7 finance ministers in the Canadian Arctic, Nunavut leaders generously
hosted their international visitors with a taste of northern cuisine,
included a staple of their subsistence diet: seal meat. As Andrew Clark
reported in The Guardian, "None of the visiting ministers chose
to attend a feast on Saturday night, laid on by the local Inuit community, at
which raw seal was on the menu. Canada's Jim Flaherty was left to chow down
on some seal meat alone." Indeed, the refusal of the European G7 finance
ministers to dine with the Inuit, and their very undiplomatic
decision to disrespect Inuit hospitality in Nunavut's capital city by
refusing to attend a feast held in their honor by the Inuit, was certainly
not Europe's best moment. The opportunity to restore a climate of mutual
friendship and trust may, with proper attention, still be with us; but that
will take a more strenuous, and respectful, effort by the Europeans to mend
fences with the still disappointed Inuit. This is perhaps why Secretary of
State Clinton recently rebuked her Canadian counterparts for their exclusion
of indigenous northerners from a diplomatic conference on the future of the
Arctic, calling upon her peers to provide the Inuit with a seat at the
table.
The Inuit may be few in number, but they control many local
economic and political levers, and their interests are now fully backed by
Ottawa – their partner in land claims, self-government, and northern
development. Resolving lingering tensions between Europe and the Inuit is a
necessary step to ensure the security of the high North, as greater issues
are now in play that could affect the destiny of nations more than one
people's views of another's dietary preferences. It wouldn't take much
diplomatic savvy for the Russian bear to seize the opportunity, and break
bread with the Inuit over tasty slabs of whale and seal meat, hoping to
forever drive a wedge between the people of the Arctic and the European
states whose security will increasingly be tied to fate of the Arctic.
Secretary Clinton's overture to the Inuit was thus a well timed and
diplomatically pre-emptive move to ensure the West doesn't lose the North on
her watch.
The Russian Bear
Russian Arctic activities in the North generally focus on
its vast, resource-rich and uniquely shallow continental shelf – which
it smartly wants the world to recognize as Russian territorial waters, and
which under UNCLOS will likely be considered largely to be Russian
territorial and not high seas. Its diplomatic stunt beneath the North Pole a
few years back was less a grab for the polar seabed, and more an assertion
that there is a "Russian side" of the Arctic. Moscow would love the
North Pole to be the boundary point as it was in the Cold War, but UNCLOS and
the International Seabed Authority may, once all the claims are filed and
adjudicated, find that Canadian territorial waters extend past the pole into
what Moscow views as the Russian side, depending in part on what the US,
Canada, and Russia can prove as continental shelf extensions. In a nutshell,
the primary Arctic tension (other than that between its indigenous peoples
and the broad group of "southerners" who assert sovereign claim to
the high North) is over offshore boundaries, and here the main fault line is
between Russia on the one hand, and the "West" (Canada, the US, and
its European allies) on the other. The US and Canada are cooperating more
closely even without agreeing fully on their own Beaufort Sea boundary
dispute; and the running dispute between Ottawa and the Danes over Hans
Island seems mostly for domestic play. In the end, I suspect the old
East/West rivalry will kick in, since that seems to still be the primary
fault line between states, which again suggests Arctic fits nicely as part of
EUCOM's AO and its focus on securing Europe from external threat.
Though my view is the Russian interest is largely in the
exploitation and development of the enormous natural resource wealth along
its northern shores, and rehabilitating the (all but abandoned until
recently) Northern Sea Route to bring this vast treasure chest of northern
resources to market. With – by quirk of natural geography – the
most extensive, shallow and accessible of Arctic continental shelves, Russia
has the most to gain from an Arctic thaw (with the exception, perhaps, of
Canada). Just as Canadians have a powerful emotional attachment to their
northern frontier, Russians view their Arctic lands and seas as an extension
of their heartland – which for them is their key to their survival,
military or economic. While diplomatically, it'll likely assert as wide a
claim to the offshore Arctic as can be defended under international law,
Russia perhaps more than any other Arctic state feels the Arctic belongs to
them (not all of it, but more or less half of it). The intensity of their
attachment, and the strategic importance of the heartland to Russian
geopolitics, which saved the Russian nation from Napoleon's armies as it did
from Hitler's, combine to form a vital national interest for Moscow.
What does this mean? Russia is more inclined to fully
utilize its Arctic assets (at least in theory, though in practice the
post-Soviet economic collapse led to a nearly universal abandonment of the
centrally subsidized mega-projects in the vast and now rusting Russian
Arctic, and a near collapse of their maritime infrastructure along the
Northern Sea Route.) But ideologically, there is a growing rhetorical and
political commitment to a fuller utilization of the Russian Arctic and a
sense that Russia's destiny, and the source of its future wealth, is tied to
its fate of the North. And as Moscow's confidence and capabilities increase,
defending these assets will be a top priority. Already there has been a
restoration of Arctic naval, land, and air exercises to show the world that
Moscow is serious about its Arctic ambitions, though these may be viewed as
largely defensive in nature. Along its borders, where the defensive nature of
its regional military deployments could appear to be more menacing, and with
inherently offensive potential, this may lead to palpable tensions with
neighbors, especially after Moscow's smackdown of Georgia. Now, there is
little doubt that Russia would aggressively defend its Arctic interests, and
even potentially pre-empt any claims contrary to its national
interests.
Still raw is Russia's loss of empire – first with the
1867 Alaska sale to the United States, which many in Russia still feel was
nothing short of theft, and whose history remains clouded in distrust. The
Russian-America Company was basically shuttered by Moscow after decades of
investment and development, plus the noble sacrifices of its explorers who
risked so much to explore and colonize the high North Pacific, leaving many
Russians confused by the suddenly announced and never fully explained
abandonment of Alaska. Some Russian nationalists still include a Russian
Alaska on their maps, though largely symbolic and not necessarily a
reflection of their military ambitions. Then, in our time, with the Soviet
collapse, Russia became even smaller and more vulnerable with the loss of its
Central European, Central Asia, and Baltic empire. Its remaining Arctic lands
and seas are thus highly valued as a sacred part of Mother Russia, key to its
future, and one of the last sources of pride and greatness it has left. Plus,
with new French warships on the way, and more heavy icebreakers than any of
its neighbors, Russia may well emerge as something of a regional power in the
high North. Still largely defensive, perhaps, but much more capable.
While Russia was at the table at Ilulissat in 2008 and
pledged to support international law and the UNCLOS mechanism, one must
wonder what Moscow would do if the UN sided with Canada or Denmark in terms
of continental shelf extensions at Russia's expense. On the other hand, the
Arctic (like Gorbachev proposed in the 1980s) could be a great testing ground
for a new relationship between Russia and the West, and perhaps – if
cooperation trumps competition over time – a path toward eventual NATO
membership. But if competition trumps cooperation in the end, the Arctic may
become one of the first regions in which a newly assertive Russia confronts
the West. That's one more reason why EUCOM will invariably be drawn into the
increasingly salient and ever challenging mission of securing the
Arctic.
Pacific Currents
If you look at which countries are Arctic nations, the
coastal nations include Russia, Norway, Denmark/Greenland, Iceland (though
its territory is all subarctic its northern waters are to the north of the
Arctic Circle), Canada and the US; and the noncoastal Arctic states include
Finland and Sweden. Most are European, and the non-European Arctic states are
NATO members with close historical, cultural, and strategic links to Europe.
Only Russia’s sparsely populated Far East and Alaska’s equally
sparsely settled southwest and southeast coasts abut Pacific waters.
While Japan made a dramatic but in the end tenuous grab in
its militarist past for the high North Pacific, gaining possession of the
Kuriles, Sakhalin, Kamchatka and the Komandorskis, and during the open shots
of World War II, the outer Aleutians as well; and had well developed colonies
in the southern part of Sakhalin and on Kamchatka, Tokyo's far northern reign
was brief – and currently its ambitions are very limited in the region
(mostly with regard to restoring its sovereign claim to the Kuriles). So
they're basically not a major player, and unlikely to become one unless they
undergo a huge sea change politically.
And while China has increased its Arctic activities, its
primary ambition is likely to establish a secure, and dramatically shortened,
direct trade route with Europe, and to benefit from the exploitation of
natural resources formerly inaccessible along the way, and these economic
interests would favor a less aggressive position than Japan took during World
War II, which viewed the region’s resources less collaboratively. While
Beijing will compete aggressively for resources, it will likely do so as a
member of the world economy, and not as an external disruptor like Tokyo did
in earlier times. So even as Northeast Asia eyes the thawing Arctic, it views
the region as a gateway to European markets, and new sources of natural
resources for its expanding economy.
Ultimately, translatlantic relations and the security of the
West, and the continuing integration of the economies of the industrialized
Far East with those of Europe, will depend upon ensuring the security of the
Arctic – making EUCOM the right command, in the right place, to oversee
Arctic security issues for the years immediately ahead. For so long as the
ice returns, and so long as winter still rules the Far North, proximity to
the awakening Russian bear, and experience in taming its more aggressive
instincts, will be the key to a secure and peaceful North.
About the Author
Barry S. Zellen is author of three books on Arctic politics
and history: Breaking the Ice: From Land Claims to Tribal Sovereignty in
the Arctic (Lexington Books 2008); On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State
and the Challenge of Arctic Sovereignty (Lexington Books 2009); and
Arctic Doom, Arctic Boom: The Geopolitics of Climate Change in the
Arctic (Praeger, Security and the Environment series, 2009). He is also
author of the forthcoming four-volume book set: States of Mind: The
Realist Tradition and Foundation of Western Order (PSI, 2011).
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